Perhaps it may be of sime use if, in conclusion, i were to set out how the argument of this book avoids these various traps, and how far it gets us :
1. An adequate theory of agency must be a theory of the causal powers persons have.
2. Structures play an ineliminable role in social events is in question.
3. Historical materialism is itself a theory of structural capacities.
4. This analysis of structures in terms of their role in determining agents' causal powers allows us to avoid the dead-end of structuralism in both its althusserian and parsonian forms.
5. Indeed, the present treatment of structure is consistent with a much stronger theory of agency than that to which rational-choice theorists subscribe.
6. The existence of structural capacities is not equivalent to that of collectivities exercising them.
7. My underlying preoccupattion in developing these arguments, however, has been less with better social theory than with a better social theory than with a better social world.

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